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Bayesian Confirmation and Auxiliary Hypotheses Revisited: A Reply to Strevens
11 references·4 citing·40 second hop
Bayesian Confirmation and Auxiliary Hypotheses Revisited: A Reply to Strevens (2005)Bayesian Confirmation and Auxiliary Hypot…Likelihood, Model Selection, and the Duhem-Quine Problem (2003)Likelihood, Model Selection, …Symmetries and Asymmetries in Evidential Support (2002)Symmetries and Asymmetries in…Putting the Irrelevance Back Into the Problem of Irrelevant Conjunction (2002)Putting the Irrelevance Back …The Bayesian Treatment of Auxiliary Hypotheses (2001)The Bayesian Treatment of Aux…STUDIES IN BAYESIAN CONFIRMATION THEORY (2001)STUDIES IN BAYESIAN CONFIRMAT…The Plurality of Bayesian Measures of Confirmation and the Problem of Measure Sensitivity (1999)The Plurality of Bayesian Mea…log[P(h/eb)/P(h/b)] Is the One True Measure of Confirmation (1996)log[P(h/eb)/P(h/b)] Is the On…Bayes or Bust? A Critical Examination of Bayesian Confirmation Theory. (1994)Bayes or Bust? A Critical Exa…Scientific reasoning: the Bayesian approach (1990)Scientific reasoning: the Bay…Bayesian personalism, the methodology of scientific research programmes, and Duhem's problem (1979)Bayesian personalism, the met…THE PARADOX OF CONFIRMATION (1960)THE PARADOX OF CONFIRMATIONBayesian belief protection: A study of belief in conspiracy theories (2023)Bayesian belief protection: A…An impossibility theorem for amalgamating evidence (2011)An impossibility theorem for …Comparative Bayesian Confirmation and the Quine–Duhem Problem: A Rejoinder to Strevens (2007)Comparative Bayesian Confirma…The Bayesian Treatment of Auxiliary Hypotheses: Reply to Fitelson and Waterman (2005)The Bayesian Treatment of Aux…The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory (1954)Alternative projections of mortality and disability by cause 1990–2020: Global Burden of Disease Study (1997)The Epidemiologic Transition: A Theory of the Epidemiology of Population Change (2005)Going beyond the evidence: Abstract laws and preschoolers’ responses to anomalous data (2008)What Scientific Progress Is Not: Against Bird’s Epistemic View (2010)Improving social and behavioral science by making replication mainstream: A response to commentaries (2018)Probability and the Weighing of Evidence. (1950)Minnesota studies in the philosophy of science (1956)Induction and Probability (2002)Likelihoodism, Bayesianism, and relational confirmation (2007)Logic of Statistical Inference (2016)A Treatise on Probability (1973)Philosophical explanations (1986)Foundations of Measurement (1990)Tracking Truth (2005)On Bayesian Measures of Evidential Support: Theoretical and Empirical Issues (2007)The Evidential Foundations of Probabilistic Reasoning. (1995)The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory (1999)A Bayesian Account of Independent Evidence with Applications (2001)I.—STUDIES IN THE LOGIC OF CONFIRMATION (II.) (1945)Bayes or bust?: a critical examination of Bayesian confirmation theory (1993)Irrelevant Conjunction: Statement and Solution of a New Paradox (2010)Varieties of Bayesianism (2011)State of the field: Measuring information and confirmation (2014)The Scientific Image. (1982)How Bayesian Confirmation Theory Handles the Paradox of the Ravens (2010)The Bootstrapping Problem (2012)The Logic of Scientific Discovery (2013)Inductive Logic and the Ravens Paradox (1999)Hempel's Raven Paradox: A Lacuna in the Standard Bayesian Solution (2004)Improving the Meta-Analytic Assessment of Effect Size Variance With an Informed Bayesian Prior (2014)A rational analysis of the selection task as optimal data selection. (1994)Individual differences in rational thought. (1998)How persuasive is a good fit? A comment on theory testing. (2000)Rational belief (1983)The Stability Theory of Belief (2014)How to never be wrong (2018)How to improve Bayesian reasoning without instruction: Frequency formats. (1995)The Possibility Principle: Choosing Negative Cases in Comparative Research (2004)BELIEF IS CREDENCE ONE (IN CONTEXT) (2013)
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References

  • 1990Scientific reasoning: the Bayesian approach1,245 cited
  • 1994Bayes or Bust? A Critical Examination of Bayesian Confirmation Theory.494 cited
  • 1999The Plurality of Bayesian Measures of Confirmation and the Problem of Measure Sensitivity280 cited
  • 2002Symmetries and Asymmetries in Evidential Support152 cited
  • 2001STUDIES IN BAYESIAN CONFIRMATION THEORY150 cited
  • 1979Bayesian personalism, the methodology of scientific research programmes, and Duhem's problem125 cited
  • 1996log[P(h/eb)/P(h/b)] Is the One True Measure of Confirmation92 cited
  • 2001The Bayesian Treatment of Auxiliary Hypotheses59 cited
  • 2002Putting the Irrelevance Back Into the Problem of Irrelevant Conjunction53 cited
  • 1960THE PARADOX OF CONFIRMATION44 cited
  • 2003Likelihood, Model Selection, and the Duhem-Quine Problem37 cited

Cited by

  • 2011An impossibility theorem for amalgamating evidence26 cited
  • 2023Bayesian belief protection: A study of belief in conspiracy theories22 cited
  • 2005The Bayesian Treatment of Auxiliary Hypotheses: Reply to Fitelson and Waterman10 cited
  • 2007Comparative Bayesian Confirmation and the Quine–Duhem Problem: A Rejoinder to Strevens

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9 cited