The Optimal Level of Generosity in a Selfish, Uncertain Environment

Per Molander

217 citations0/0 files storedJournal of Conflict Resolution

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Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation Game Theory and Applications Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies

Abstract

The tit-for-tat strategy in iterated prisoners' dilemma games is examined in the presence of disturbances. It is shown that performance deteriorates drastically at arbitrarily low noise levels. The situation may be remedied by introducing some unconditional generosity. This may be done without exposing oneself to the risk of exploitation by the other party.

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1981The Evolution of Cooperation 1980Effective Choice in the Prisoner's Dilemma 1980More Effective Choice in the Prisoner's Dilemma

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1991When in Doubt...2007Tit-for-tat or win-stay, lose-shift?2018Partners and rivals in direct reciprocity 2007TRANSFORMING THE DILEMMA 2008Direct reciprocity with costly punishment: Generous tit-for-tat prevails 2017Memory- n strategies of direct reciprocity 1995Testing models of non-kin cooperation: mutualism and the Prisoner’s Dilemma 1999The Continuous Prisoner's Dilemma: I. Linear Reactive Strategies

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