On the Rationality of Belief-Invariance in Light of Peer Disagreement

Abstract

If you are currently a reliable epistemic agent in some domain, you would not want to adopt a rule of belief-revision in that domain that rendered you less reliable. However, you probably would want to adopt a rule that rendered you more reliable in that domain. In the epistemology of disagreement, there are two main competing rules offered for belief-revision in the face of peer disagreement: maintaining your existing opinion, or meeting halfway. This article investigates the comparative reliability of these two rules using two measures of reliability for degrees of belief, calibration and Brier scoring. Using one measure of reliability, it can be shown that necessarily, meeting halfway is the more reliable rule. Using another measure of reliability, it can be shown that generally, belief-invariance is the more reliable rule. This article argues from these formal results that belief-invariance in light of peer disagreement is sometimes rationally permissible and that, even when it is not, being required to revise your opinions in light of peer disagreement does not lead to any kind of problematic skepticism.

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