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Implementation and Renegotiation
9 references·16 citing·35 second hop
Implementation and Renegotiation (1999)Implementation and RenegotiationUnforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts (1999)Unforeseen Contingencies and …Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality (1999)Nash Equilibrium and Welfare …Complexity and Renegotiation: A Foundation for Incomplete Contracts (1999)Complexity and Renegotiation:…Foundations of Incomplete Contracts (1998)Foundations of Incomplete Con…Option Contracts and Renegotiation: A Solution to the Hold-up Problem (1995)Option Contracts and Renegoti…Moral Hazard and Verifiability: The Effects of Renegotiation in Agency (1991)Moral Hazard and Verifiabilit…Incomplete Contracts, Specific Investments, and Risk Sharing (1991)Incomplete Contracts, Specifi…Subgame Perfect Implementation (1988)Subgame Perfect ImplementationIncomplete Contracts and Renegotiation (1988)Incomplete Contracts and Rene…Robustness in Mechanism Design and Contracting (2019)Robustness in Mechanism Desig…The Real Option Value of Renegotiation in Public–Private Partnerships (2016)The Real Option Value of Rene…LET'S TALK: HOW COMMUNICATION AFFECTS CONTRACT DESIGN (2015)LET'S TALK: HOW COMMUNICATION…Model for Financial Renegotiation in Public-Private Partnership Projects and Its Policy Implications: Game Theoretic View (2006)Model for Financial Renegotia…Hard evidence and mechanism design (2006)Hard evidence and mechanism d…The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules (2004)The Theory of Implementation …The Law and Economics of Costly Contracting (2004)The Law and Economics of Cost…Evidence disclosure and verifiability (2004)Evidence disclosure and verif…The Mirrlees Approach to Mechanism Design with Renegotiation (with Applications to Hold-up and Risk Sharing) (2002)The Mirrlees Approach to Mech…On indescribable contingencies and incomplete contracts (2002)On indescribable contingencie…Citizen Oversight and the Electoral Incentives of Criminal Prosecutors (2002)Citizen Oversight and the Ele…Chapter 5 Implementation theory (2002)Chapter 5 Implementation theo…Two Remarks on the Property-Rights Literature (1999)Two Remarks on the Property-R…Incomplete Contracts: Where do We Stand? (1999)Incomplete Contracts: Where d…Economic Analysis of Law (1999)Economic Analysis of LawMoral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts (1990)Moral Hazard and Renegotiatio…The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration (1986)The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (1987)Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm (1990)Transaction Cost Economics: How It Works; Where It is Headed (1998)Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process (1978)Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations (1979)Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model (1982)Introduction: The Embeddedness of Economic Markets in Economics (1998)Discovery and Creation: Alternative Theories of Entrepreneurial Action (2006)Moral Hazard and Observability (1979)Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship (1979)An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem (1983)The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values (1992)Moral Hazard and Secured Lending in an Infinitely Repeated Credit Market Game (1994)The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model (2001)Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games (1975)Optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents (1984)Separation of Powers and Political Accountability (1997)Social Choice and Individual Values. (1951)Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result (1973)A Course in Game Theory (1994)Fairness, Responsibility, and Welfare (2008)The Nature of the Firm (1937)Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. (1976)Foundations of social theory (1990)Formal and Real Authority in Organizations (1997)Authority and Communication in Organizations (2002)Moral Hazard in Teams (1982)Global Sourcing (2004)Opportunism in Interfirm Relationships: Forms, Outcomes, and Solutions (2000)The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead (2000)Chapter 8 The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism – Experimental Evidence and New Theories (2006)Firms, Contracts, and Trade Structure (2003)Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information (1994)Sequential Investments and Options to Own (1998)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1988Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation1,885 cited
  • 1999Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality1,182 cited
  • 1998Foundations of Incomplete Contracts968 cited
  • 1999Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts775 cited
  • 1988Subgame Perfect Implementation463 cited
  • 1995Option Contracts and Renegotiation: A Solution to the Hold-up Problem451 cited
  • 1999Complexity and Renegotiation: A Foundation for Incomplete Contracts377 cited
  • 1991Incomplete Contracts, Specific Investments, and Risk Sharing290 cited
  • 1991Moral Hazard and Verifiability: The Effects of Renegotiation in Agency243 cited

Cited by

  • 1999Incomplete Contracts: Where do We Stand?1,200 cited
  • 1990Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts410 cited
  • 2002Chapter 5 Implementation theory185 cited
  • 1999Two Remarks on the Property-Rights Literature167 cited
  • 2006Model for Financial Renegotiation in Public-Private Partnership Projects and Its Policy Implications: Game Theoretic View144 cited
  • 2002Citizen Oversight and the Electoral Incentives of Criminal Prosecutors131 cited

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1999
Economic Analysis of Law
127 cited
  • 2002The Mirrlees Approach to Mechanism Design with Renegotiation (with Applications to Hold-up and Risk Sharing)122 cited
  • 2004The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules103 cited
  • 2006Hard evidence and mechanism design102 cited
  • 2004Evidence disclosure and verifiability102 cited
  • 2004The Law and Economics of Costly Contracting96 cited
  • 2019Robustness in Mechanism Design and Contracting89 cited
  • 2016The Real Option Value of Renegotiation in Public–Private Partnerships85 cited
  • 2015LET'S TALK: HOW COMMUNICATION AFFECTS CONTRACT DESIGN82 cited
  • 2002On indescribable contingencies and incomplete contracts82 cited