The resiliency exhibited by some theories or derived hypotheses, despite their periodically "conclusive" refutation, is examined by taking the generic hypothesis on the connection between ascetic Protestantism and the emergence of modern science as a case in point. Refutations proposed in the Becker critique of the specific instance of Pietism and science strengthen rather than weaken the grounds for deepened interest in exploring both the generic and specific hypothesese insofar as the critique exhibits the fallacy of the latest word. That fallacy rests on three common but untenable tacit assumptions: (1) that latest word correctly formulates the essentials of the preceding word while being immune to the failures of observation and inference imputed to what went before, (2) that each succeeding work improves on its knowledge base, and (3) that theoretically derived hypotheses are to be abandoned as soon as they seem to be empirically falsified. An Appendix examines evidence on the sociohistorical particulars of the case.
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