Defending the structural concept of representation

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153 citations0/0 files storedTHEORIA An International Journal for Theory History and Foundations of Science

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Philosophy and History of Science Philosophy and Theoretical Science Philosophy, Science, and History

Abstract

The paper defends the structural concept of representation, defined by homomorphisms, against the main objections that have been raised against it: Logical objections, the objection from misrepresentation, the objection from failing necessity, and the copy theory objection. Homomorphic representations are not necessarily 'copies' of their representanda, and thus can convey scientific insight.

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1989Studies in the Way of Words 1987The Intentional Stance 1982The Scientific Image.1991Explaining Science: A Cognitive Approach.1956Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes 1968Languages of Art 1998Der logische Aufbau der Welt 1979Languages of Art: An Approach to a Theory of Symbols.

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