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The Nash bargaining solution is optimal
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The Nash bargaining solution is optimal (1986)The Nash bargaining solution is optimalGame-Theoretic Models of Bargaining (1985)Game-Theoretic Models of Barg…Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model (1982)Perfect Equilibrium in a Barg…Axiomatic Models of Bargaining (1979)Axiomatic Models of BargainingRational Behaviour and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations (1977)Rational Behaviour and Bargai…Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons (1977)Proportional Solutions to Bar…Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large (1976)Risk Aversion in the Small an…Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem (1975)Other Solutions to Nash's Bar…Risk aversion with many commodities (1974)Risk aversion with many commo…Essays in the Theory of Risk-Bearing. (1972)Essays in the Theory of Risk-…A Generalized Nash Solution for Two-Person Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information (1972)A Generalized Nash Solution f…Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large (1964)Risk Aversion in the Small an…Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey. (1958)Games and Decisions: Introduc…Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey. (1958)Games and Decisions: Introduc…Two-Person Cooperative Games (1953)Two-Person Cooperative GamesThe Bargaining Problem (1950)The Bargaining ProblemEquilibrium points in n -person games (1950)Equilibrium points in n -pers…Commitment and Conflict in Bilateral Bargaining (2008)Commitment and Conflict in Bi…Fifty Years of the Nash Program, 1953-2003 (2005)Fifty Years of the Nash Progr…Trade Wars, Trade Negotiations and Applied Game Theory (1991)Trade Wars, Trade Negotiation…Search, Wage Bargains and Cycles (1987)Search, Wage Bargains and Cyc…Marriage and Household Decision-Making: A Bargaining Analysis (1980)Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-Party System as a Repeated Game (1987)The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure (2003)Games and Decisions (2015)Mathematical Psychics. An Essay on the Application of Mathematics to the Moral Sciences. (1935)Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games (1975)The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration (1986)An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism (2001)Varieties of Capitalism (2001)Trust and suspicion (1958)The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance (1981)Cognitive Adaptations for Social Exchange (1992)A problem of rights arbitration from the Talmud (1982)Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach (1993)Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics (1997)Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem (1979)THE JOINT‐DECISION TRAP: LESSONS FROM GERMAN FEDERALISM AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION (1988)Covenants with and without a Sword: Self-Governance Is Possible (1992)Moral Hazard and Observability (1979)Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk (1988)The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead (2000)The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling (1986)''Bargaining'' and Gender Relations: Within and Beyond the Household (1997)Non-cooperative games (1989)Evolutionary games on graphs (2007)Existence of an equilibrium for a competitive economy (2008)Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring (1984)Well-being : the foundations of hedonic psychology (1999)On the measurement of inequality (1970)THE VALUATION OF RISK ASSETS AND THE SELECTION OF RISKY INVESTMENTS IN STOCK PORTFOLIOS AND CAPITAL BUDGETS**This paper is another in a series of interrelated theoretical and statistical studies of corporate financial and investment policies being made under grants from the Rockefeller Foundation, and more recently the Ford Foundation, to the Harvard Business School. The generous support for this work is most gratefully acknowledged. The author is also much indebted to his colleagues Professors Bishop, Christenson, Kahr, Raiffa, and (especially) Schlaifer, for extensive discussion and commentary on an earlier draft of this paper; but responsibility for any errors or imperfections remains strictly his own.[Professor Sharpe's paper, “Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium Under Conditions of Risk” (Journal of Finance, September 1964) appeared after this paper was in final form and on its way to the printers. My first section, which parallels the first half of his paper (with corresponding conclusions), sets the algebraic framework for sections II, III and VI, (which have no counterpart in his paper) and for section IV on the equilibrium prices of risk assets, concerning which our results differ significantly for reasons which will be explored elsewhere. Sharpe does not take up the capital budgeting problem developed in section V below.] (1975)The arbitrage theory of capital asset pricing (1976)
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References

  • 1950The Bargaining Problem8,031 cited
  • 1950Equilibrium points in n -person games7,555 cited
  • 1982Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model5,287 cited
  • 1964Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large4,964 cited
  • 1976Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large4,655 cited
  • 1972Essays in the Theory of Risk-Bearing.3,991 cited
  • 1953Two-Person Cooperative Games3,219 cited
  • 1958Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey.1,944 cited
  • 1975Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem1,805 cited
  • 1977Rational Behaviour and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations1,431 cited
  • 1979Axiomatic Models of Bargaining805 cited
  • 1977Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons781 cited
  • 1958Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey.777 cited
  • 1972A Generalized Nash Solution for Two-Person Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information580 cited
  • 1985Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining497 cited
  • 1974Risk aversion with many commodities394 cited

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Cited by

  • 2005Fifty Years of the Nash Program, 1953-200388 cited
  • 1987Search, Wage Bargains and Cycles79 cited
  • 2008Commitment and Conflict in Bilateral Bargaining56 cited
  • 1991Trade Wars, Trade Negotiations and Applied Game Theory45 cited