On indefinite descriptions

Abstract

This paper explores some aspects of the semantics and pragmatics of indefinite descriptions. It is often noted that indefinite descriptions may be interpreted in several ways: attributively, referentially, specifically, generically, etc. I argue that indefinite descriptions are not semantically ambiguous and that their various interpretations are better explained on the basis of general communicative principles. Assuming an unambiguous semantics, I develop a pragmatic account of the attributive, the specific and the referential interpretation, placed within the framework of relevance theory. I compare this analysis to a Gricean one and argue that the relevance theoretic account is more adequate. Finally, I show that the proposed analysis can be extended to account for the generic and the predicative interpretations as well.

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