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Auctions Versus Negotiations
4 references·16 citing·39 second hop
Auctions Versus Negotiations (1996)Auctions Versus NegotiationsCorporate control contests and capital structure (1988)Corporate control contests an…A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding (1982)A Theory of Auctions and Comp…Optimal Auction Design (1981)Optimal Auction DesignTakeover Bids, The Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation (1980)Takeover Bids, The Free-Rider…The effect of discretion on procurement performance (2018)The effect of discretion on p…Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms (2017)Obviously Strategy-Proof Mech…Twenty Lectures on Algorithmic Game Theory (2016)Twenty Lectures on Algorithmi…The sample complexity of revenue maximization (2014)The sample complexity of reve…Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions (2014)Demand Reduction and Ineffici…Bidding for Incomplete Contracts: An Empirical Analysis of Adaptation Costs (2014)Bidding for Incomplete Contra…Discrete Bids and Empirical Inference in Divisible Good Auctions (2011)Discrete Bids and Empirical I…Negotiations under the threat of an auction (2010)Negotiations under the threat…Simple versus optimal mechanisms (2009)Simple versus optimal mechani…Auctions Versus Negotiations in Procurement: An Empirical Analysis (2008)Auctions Versus Negotiations …The Impact of Online Reverse Auction Design on Buyer–Supplier Relationships (2006)The Impact of Online Reverse …Reverse auctions––grounded theory from the buyer and supplier perspective (2003)Reverse auctions––grounded th…Competitive Bidding in Auctions with Private and Common Values (2003)Competitive Bidding in Auctio…An Exploratory Study of the Introduction of Online Reverse Auctions (2003)An Exploratory Study of the I…Electronic reverse auctions (2002)Electronic reverse auctionsToeholds and Takeovers (1999)Toeholds and TakeoversCOUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS (1961)Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications (1981)The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model (2001)Field Experiments (2004)Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control (1965)The Determination of Financial Structure: The Incentive-Signalling Approach (1977)A Survey of Corporate Governance (1997)Corporate Ownership Around the World (1999)Markets and Hierarchies (1975)The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (1987)The Vertical Integration of Production Market Failure Considerations (1999)A Study of the Internal Organization of a Bidding Cartel (2010)Procurement Contracting With Time Incentives: Theory and Evidence * (2010)All the president's friends: Political access and firm value (2020)The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment (1958)Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure (1976)Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers (1986)Corporate governance (1988)The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems (1999)The Choice of Payment Method in European Mergers and Acquisitions (2005)Multitask Principal–Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design (1991)A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation (1993)The Simple Microeconomics of Public‐Private Partnerships (2014)Political Connections and Allocative Distortions (2018)Moral Hazard and Observability (1979)z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments (2007)Marketplaces, Markets, and Market Design (2018)How to run an experimental auction: a review of recent advances (2019)Experimental methods: Eliciting beliefs (2021)Large Shareholders and Corporate Control (1986)How (not) to run auctions: The European 3G telecom auctions (2002)Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design (2002)PUTTING AUCTION THEORY TO WORK (2004)Putting Auction Theory to Work: The Simultaneous Ascending Auction (2000)Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding (2002)An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects (2004)Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading (1983)The interdisciplinary study of coordination (1994)A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for an Additive Buyer (2014)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1981Optimal Auction Design5,938 cited
  • 1982A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding3,770 cited
  • 1980Takeover Bids, The Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation3,093 cited
  • 1988Corporate control contests and capital structure704 cited

Cited by

  • 2014Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions800 cited
  • 2008Auctions Versus Negotiations in Procurement: An Empirical Analysis444 cited
  • 2017Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms444 cited
  • 1999Toeholds and Takeovers388 cited
  • 2014Bidding for Incomplete Contracts: An Empirical Analysis of Adaptation Costs364 cited
  • 2009Simple versus optimal mechanisms317 cited
  • 2003An Exploratory Study of the Introduction of Online Reverse Auctions255 cited
  • 2010Negotiations under the threat of an auction222 cited
  • 2006The Impact of Online Reverse Auction Design on Buyer–Supplier Relationships213 cited
  • 2014The sample complexity of revenue maximization198 cited
  • 2011Discrete Bids and Empirical Inference in Divisible Good Auctions187 cited
  • 2018

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The effect of discretion on procurement performance
187 cited
  • 2002Electronic reverse auctions180 cited
  • 2003Reverse auctions––grounded theory from the buyer and supplier perspective170 cited
  • 2016Twenty Lectures on Algorithmic Game Theory168 cited
  • 2003Competitive Bidding in Auctions with Private and Common Values163 cited