Last-Minute Bidding and the Rules for Ending Second-Price Auctions: Evidence from eBay and Amazon Auctions on the Internet

2002-08-01articleAmerican Economic Review966 citationsclosed

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Auction Theory and Applications Art History and Market Analysis Game Theory and Voting Systems

Abstract

Last-Minute Bidding and the Rules for Ending Second-Price Auctions: Evidence from eBay and Amazon Auctions on the Internet by Alvin E. Roth and Axel Ockenfels. Published in volume 92, issue 4, pages 1093-1103 of American Economic Review, September 2002

Citations in this library

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References

2004Trust among strangers in internet transactions: Empirical analysis of eBay' s reputation system

2003The Winner's Curse, Reserve Prices, and Endogenous Entry: Empirical Insights from eBay Auctions

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