Harm: Omission, Preemption, Freedom

Nathan Hanna

63 citations0/0 files storedPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research

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Philosophical Ethics and Theory Ethics, Aesthetics, and Art Free Will and Agency

Abstract

The Counterfactual Comparative Account of Harm says that an event is overall harmful for someone if and only if it makes her worse off than she otherwise would have been. I defend this account from two common objections.

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References

2015Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 1979Counterfactual Dependence and Time's Arrow 2009Well-Being and Death 2004Can We Harm and Benefit In Creating?2009Harming as Causing Harm 2012HARM AND ITS MORAL SIGNIFICANCE 2014The Non-Identity Problem and the Ethics of Future People 2014Philosophical Foundations of the Law of Torts

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2017Harming by Failing to Benefit 2018Harm and Discrimination 2019Harming and failing to benefit: a reply to purves 2020Well-Being Counterfactualist Accounts of Harm and Benefit 2022Causal Accounts of Harming 2017When Good Things Happen to Harmed People 2020Harm as a Necessary Component of the Concept of Medical Disorder: Reply to Muckler and Taylor

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