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When Is It Optimal to Delegate: The Theory of Fast-Track Authority
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References

  • 1994A Course in Game Theory5,468 cited
  • 1985The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target3,687 cited
  • 1992Protection For Sale3,302 cited
  • 2000Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll Call Voting2,798 cited
  • 1963The Theory of Political Coalitions2,106 cited
  • 1989Bargaining in Legislatures1,978 cited
  • 1991Information and Legislative Organization1,723 cited
  • 2002Centralized versus decentralized provision of local public goods: a political economy approach1,103 cited
  • 1984Endogenous Tariff Formation.687 cited
  • 1994Divided government and U.S. trade policy: theory and evidence292 cited
  • 1982Endogenous Tariffs, the Political Economy of Trade Restrictions, and Welfare245 cited
  • 1997The Institutional Roots of American Trade Policy: Politics, Coalitions, and International Trade233 cited
  • 1989Delegation as Commitment: The Case of Income Tax Audits188 cited
  • 2002Uniqueness of Stationary Equilibrium Payoffs in the Baron–Ferejohn Model186 cited
  • 1990Bilateral Trade Elasticities179 cited
  • 1993The Simplest Equilibrium of a Majority-Rule Division Game

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