Competition as an Evolutionary Process and Antitrust Policy

Abstract

The antitrust debate in the United States has been grounded and guided by principles derived from equilibrium-based economics. However, these principles mischaracterize key elements of real economies. The authors (1) explore the nature of the antitrust debate by reviewing a key component of the debate—the efficiency versus wealth transfer argument; (2) illustrate how the equilibrium-based tradition has misguided the debate; (3) sketch an alternative, process view of competition that draws heavily on evolutionary and Austrian economics (resource-advantage theory; Hunt 2000b); and (4) discuss the implications of using a process view of competition as a basis for antitrust policy.

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