Why Are There So Many Theories for Sex, and What Do We Do with Them?

Abstract

It is widely known that there exists a multitude of possible explanations for the maintenance of sex; however, it is less clear how to handle such an explanatory pluralism. In this paper, we address one older and one more recent discussion on what might constitute a good theory for sex and find that they reflect a trade-off between maximizing the scientific virtues of generalism, realism, and precision. A historical analysis indicates that varying research interests and research backgrounds of the different biologists shape the trade-off. We use the reflection on the trade-offs in order to understand the existence of the diversity of theories in the field and discuss how to address the explanatory pluralism. We find that the existence of multiple theories for sex, that is, explanatory pluralism, is not surprising or embarrassing but can be seen as a resource. Still, it is important to clarify the possibilities of integration of different theories. Integration between certain theories might be complex, however, as they involve models and theories from different disciplines that have diverged historically in both conceptual and methodological aspects.

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