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Understanding Incentives: Mechanism Design Becomes Algorithm Design

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2018Deep Learning for Revenue-Optimal Auctions with Budgets57 cited
2023Optimal Auctions through Deep Learning: Advances in Differentiable Economics46 cited
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2017Algorithmic Persuasion with No Externalities

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39 cited