Punishment and Counter-Punishment in Public Good Games: Can We Still Govern Ourselves?Nikos Nikiforakis2005-01-01preprintSSRN Electronic Journal89 citationsgreenNo readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.Experimental Behavioral Economics StudiesGame Theory and ApplicationsEvolutionary Game Theory and CooperationAbstractNo abstract was published for this record.Citations in this libraryStored only when both papers are in the corpus — 89 citations exist upstream.References1981The Evolution of Cooperation1992Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action1966The Logic of Collective Action.1999A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation2007z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments1960The Strategy of Conflict1954The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure1985The Evolution of CooperationCited by2005A Comparative Statics Analysis of Punishment in Public-Good Experiments2006Choosing the Stick or the Carrot? Endogenous Institutional Choice in Social Dilemma Situations2005The Importance of Emotions for the Effectiveness of Social Punishment2010Asymmetric Enforcement of Cooperation in a Social Dilemma2016Costly punishment in the ultimatum game evokes moral concern, in particular when framed as payoff reduction2015Human punishment is motivated by both a desire for revenge and a desire for equality2010Third Party Reward and Punishment: Group Size, Efficiency and Public Goods2016Information-sensitive Leviathans