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Sequences of take-it-or-leave-it offers
15 references·3 citing·35 second hop
Sequences of take-it-or-leave-it offers (2006)Sequences of take-it-or-leave-it offersInformation structures in optimal auctions (2007)Information structures in opt…Auctions with severely bounded communication (2003)Auctions with severely bounde…Complexity of Mechanism Design (2002)Complexity of Mechanism DesignSingle Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information (2001)Single Crossing Properties an…On approximating optimal auctions (2001)On approximating optimal auct…Costly valuation computation in auctions (2001)Costly valuation computation …Optimal auctions revisited (2000)Optimal auctions revisitedOptimal Auction Design for Agents with Hard Valuation Problems (2000)Optimal Auction Design for Ag…Issues in Computational Vickrey Auctions (2000)Issues in Computational Vickr…Competitive analysis of incentive compatible on-line auctions (2000)Competitive analysis of incen…Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium (1991)Perfect Bayesian equilibrium …Why Are Vickrey Auctions Rare? (1990)Why Are Vickrey Auctions Rare?Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information (1985)Distributional Strategies for…Optimal Auction Design (1981)Optimal Auction DesignCOUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS (1961)COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS,…Sequential Posted Pricing and Multi-parameter Mechanism Design (2009)Sequential Posted Pricing and…Finding equilibria in large sequential games of imperfect information (2006)Finding equilibria in large s…The private value single item bisection auction (2005)The private value single item…Multipart pricing of public goods (1971)Incentives in Teams (1973)Automated Mechanism Design: A New Application Area for Search Algorithms (2003)Markets come to bits: Evolution, computation and markomata in economic science (2007)Automated Online Mechanism Design and Prophet Inequalities (2018)Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model (1967)Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games (1975)Sequential Equilibria (1982)Credulity, lies, and costly talk ∗ (2006)Dynamic psychological games (2008)The evolution of overconfidence (2011)A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding (1982)Modeling Competitive Bidding: A Critical Essay (1994)AUCTIONS: AN INTRODUCTION (1996)Managing Online Auctions: Current Business and Research Issues (2003)Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature (1999)Incentive-compatible online auctions for digital goods (2002)Optimal auctions with correlated bidders are easy (2011)A duality based unified approach to Bayesian mechanism design (2016)The Oxford University Press, 1468–192 (1922)An approximate truthful mechanism for combinatorial auctions with single parameter agents (2003)Pricing WiFi at Starbucks (2003)Strategic Information Transmission (1982)Persuasion by Cheap Talk (2010)Robust Predictions in Games With Incomplete Information (2013)Persuasion of a Privately Informed Receiver (2017)A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence (1983)Equilibrium in Sealed High Bid Auctions (2000)Monotone Comparative Statics under Uncertainty (2002)Strategic Manipulation of Internet Opinion Forums: Implications for Consumers and Firms (2006)A Course in Game Theory (1994)Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading (1983)The interdisciplinary study of coordination (1994)Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis (1982)Empirical models of discrete games (1991)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1961COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS7,719 cited
  • 1981Optimal Auction Design5,938 cited
  • 1991Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium647 cited
  • 2001Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information569 cited
  • 1985Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information564 cited
  • 1990Why Are Vickrey Auctions Rare?383 cited
  • 2007Information structures in optimal auctions297 cited
  • 2002Complexity of Mechanism Design251 cited
  • 2000Competitive analysis of incentive compatible on-line auctions132 cited
  • 2001On approximating optimal auctions119 cited
  • 2000Issues in Computational Vickrey Auctions115 cited
  • 2001Costly valuation computation in auctions89 cited
  • 2000Optimal Auction Design for Agents with Hard Valuation Problems83 cited
  • 2000Optimal auctions revisited55 cited
  • 2003Auctions with severely bounded communication51 cited

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  • 2006Finding equilibria in large sequential games of imperfect information

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45 cited
  • 2005The private value single item bisection auction44 cited
  • 2009Sequential Posted Pricing and Multi-parameter Mechanism Design39 cited