VOTING IN FIRMS: THE ROLE OF AGENDA CONTROL, SIZE AND VOTER HOMOGENEITY

Lee Benham · Philip E. Keefer

52 citations0/0 files storedEconomic Inquiry

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Cooperative Studies and Economics Corporate Finance and Governance Game Theory and Voting Systems

Abstract

Voting is a common feature of most firms. Unrestricted voting, however, can lead to unstable decision making. We find that firms make tradeoffs among collective decision making, production scale, firm structure, and voter characteristics that are consistent with efforts to economize on the costs of voting. Firm responses include agenda control, restrictions to obtain a homogeneous voting population, and limits on firm size. We consider three long‐surviving producer cooperatives, representing extreme cases of collective decision making, and find that their organization is sensitive to the costs of voting and to the employment of mechanisms to constrain those costs.

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References

1986The Economic Institutions of Capitalism 1979Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models 1976Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control 1979Rights and Production Functions: An Application to Labor-Managed Firms and Codetermination 1967A Notion of Equilibrium and Its Possibility Under Majority Rule 1979Bureaucrats Versus Voters: On the Political Economy of Resource Allocation by Direct Democracy 1978Instability of Simple Dynamic Games 1983Voting in Corporate Law

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