Additional tests of utility theory under unique and repeated conditions

Abstract

Abstract A fundamental postulate of utility theory is its independence of long‐run considerations. Consequently, unique and repeated gambles are supposed to be treated alike. Recent empirical studies (e.g. Keren and Wagenaar, 1987; Montgomery and Adelbratt, 1982; Wedell and Bockenholt, 1989) cast doubt on the descriptive adequacy of this assumption. Additional empirical evidence is presented, supporting the claim that people exhibit different patterns of choice under unique and repeated gambles. Potential explanations for these findings are briefly discussed.

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