The autonomy – control balance in Flemish arm's length public agencies

Abstract

This article aims at contributing to the study of arm's length agencies by focusing on what are considered to be core concepts of agencification: autonomy and control of public agencies. The balance between autonomy and control is studied for a set of Flemish public agencies, from three angles: (1) To what extent can we observe the practitioner model of disaggregation, managerial freedom and results based control in Flanders?; (2) Which autonomy-control balances do we find empirically? Departing from two extreme cases – control loss and false autonomy – I conclude that there is a lot of variation amongst Flemish public agencies as to their autonomy-control balances; and (3) Based on a third set of empirical conclusions, I try to broaden the normative discussion on the accountability debate that surrounds arm's length agencies, by proposing a broader concept of steering and control. I conclude the article by proposing four directions for future research on this specific topic of agency research.

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