SZodixStudyAcademic Library
ShelvesOpen access
Study · an open academic library·Metadata from OpenAlex (CC0)·Shelves·OpenAlex metadata, de-duplicated
The Controllability Principle in Responsibility Accounting: Another Look
5 references·7 citing·39 second hop
The Controllability Principle in Responsibility Accounting: Another Look (2007)The Controllability Principle in Responsi…The theory of constraints and its implications for management accounting (1995)The theory of constraints and…Managerial Uses of Accounting Information (1994)Managerial Uses of Accounting…Capital Rationing and Organizational Slack in Capital Budgeting (1985)Capital Rationing and Organiz…Limited liability contracts between principal and agent (1983)Limited liability contracts b…Moral Hazard and Observability (1979)Moral Hazard and ObservabilityDeterminants and consequences of chief information officer equity incentives (2018)Determinants and consequences…How Powerful CFOs Camouflage and Exploit Equity-Based Incentive Compensation (2017)How Powerful CFOs Camouflage …Board Expertise and Executive Incentives (2017)Board Expertise and Executive…On the Stewardship Value of Soft Managerial Reports (2014)On the Stewardship Value of S…Endogenous Precision of Performance Measures and Limited Managerial Attention (2014)Endogenous Precision of Perfo…On the Upsides of Aggregation (2013)On the Upsides of AggregationUse of Responsibility Accounting and Measure the Satisfaction Levels of Service Organizations in Bangladesh (2011)Use of Responsibility Account…The Theory of Syndicates (1968)Essays in the Theory of Risk-Bearing. (1972)Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. (1976)Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications (1981)Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring (1984)Agency Costs, Net Worth, And Business Fluctuations (1988)An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation (1971)The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem. (1973)Agency Costs, Collateral, and Business Fluctuations (1986)Product-Market Competition and Managerial Slack (1988)Commodity Bundling and the Burden of Monopoly (1976)Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective (1999)Richard M. Cyert & James G. March, A Behavioral Theory of The Firm, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1963, 332 s. (1964)Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem (1979)Optimal Auction Design (1981)Executive Effort and Selection of Risky Projects (1986)“Cost of Capital” in Residual Income for Performance Evaluation (2002)Divisional Managers and Internal Capital Markets (2012)Conservatism in Accounting Part I: Explanations and Implications (2003)Real Incentive Effects of Soft Information (2019)Multitask Principal–Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design (1991)The Quality of Accruals and Earnings: The Role of Accrual Estimation Errors (2002)Information Precision and Manipulation Incentives (2011)Implications of a Multi-Purpose Reporting System on CEO and CFO Incentives and Risk Preferences (2016)Subjectivity in Performance Evaluations: A Review of the Literature* (2021)Formal and Real Authority in Organizations (1997)Pay without performance: the unfulfilled promise of executive compensation (2005)A Theory of Friendly Boards (2007)The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities (1973)Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure (1976)Performance matched discretionary accrual measures (2005)Getting CFO on board – its impact on firm performance and earnings quality (2020)Do Generalist CEOs Magnify Boardroom Backscratching? (2021)Assessing the Performance of Business Unit Managers (2007)The Make-or-Buy Decision in the Presence of a Rival: Strategic Outsourcing to a Common Supplier (2008)Management control systems: a review (2012)Harnessing resistance: using the theory of constraints to assist change management (2001)Overcoming the 90% Syndrome: Iteration Management in Concurrent Development Projects (2003)Integrating six sigma and theory of constraints for continuous improvement: a case study (2005)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1979Moral Hazard and Observability8,358 cited
  • 1983Limited liability contracts between principal and agent520 cited
  • 1985Capital Rationing and Organizational Slack in Capital Budgeting450 cited
  • 1995The theory of constraints and its implications for management accounting217 cited
  • 1994Managerial Uses of Accounting Information189 cited

Cited by

  • 2014Endogenous Precision of Performance Measures and Limited Managerial Attention31 cited
  • 2017Board Expertise and Executive Incentives27 cited
  • 2017How Powerful CFOs Camouflage and Exploit Equity-Based Incentive Compensation26 cited
  • 2013On the Upsides of Aggregation22 cited
  • 2014On the Stewardship Value of Soft Managerial Reports22 cited
  • 2018Determinants and consequences of chief information officer equity incentives19 cited
  • 2011Use of Responsibility Accounting and Measure the Satisfaction Levels of Service Organizations in Bangladesh17 cited

Only edges whose both ends are imported exist here. Widen the year window, or show the whole map. Back to the work