The Illusion of Avoiding Bias: How Correcting for Perceived Bias Can Make a Recommendation More Effective

Abstract

Based on previous research, we expect that consumers would be more influenced by a recommendation coming from a trusted source (e.g., a friend) than by a recommendation coming from a distrusted source (e.g., a salesperson; Wilson and Sherrell 1993). However, we demonstrate that this is not always the case. Research on bias correction shows that individuals correct for perceived bias in their judgments by making adjustments in the direction opposite to which they believe the context is influencing their judgments (Wegener and Petty 1995). Because consumers may naturally resist a recommendation from a distrusted source, attempting to remove bias from their judgments may, ironically, increase rather than decrease the effectiveness of a recommendation from a distrusted source. As a result, a recommendation from a distrusted source can become not only more effective, but just as effective as a recommendation from a trusted source. We examine three potential explanations for the moderating effect of correction on source trustworthiness effects: Changes in perceptions of ulterior motives of the recommender; changes in overall attitudes towards the recommended product; and changes in judgment (attitude) certainty. Building on previous research (Tormala and Petty 2002, 2004, Tormala, Clarkson, and Petty 2006) we propose that judgment certainty is mediating the effect. We focus on the role of certainty because research suggests that attitude certainty can change as a result of consumers’ observ

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