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Agent and Principal
16 references·16 citing·35 second hopsampled
Agent and Principal (1987)Agent and PrincipalReview of Economic Studies (2010)Review of Economic StudiesProduction, Information Costs and Economic Organization (1996)Production, Information Costs…An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem (1992)An Analysis of the Principal-…Principals and Agents: The Structure of Business (1990)Principals and Agents: The St…An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem (1983)An Analysis of the Principal-…Moral Hazard in Teams (1982)Moral Hazard in TeamsRank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts (1981)Rank-Order Tournaments as Opt…Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information (1981)Credit Rationing in Markets w…Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm (1980)Agency Problems and the Theor…Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship (1979)Risk Sharing and Incentives i…Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts (1979)Rank-Order Tournaments as Opt…Moral Hazard and Observability (1979)Moral Hazard and ObservabilityTheory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure (1976)Theory of the firm: Manageria…Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large (1976)Risk Aversion in the Small an…The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem. (1973)The Economic Theory of Agency…Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large (1964)Risk Aversion in the Small an…Governing Large Projects: A Three-Stage Process to Get It Right (2023)Governing Large Projects: A T…Taxation and agency conflicts between firm owners and managers: a review (2017)Taxation and agency conflicts…The Promise of Social Franchising as a Model to Achieve Social Goals (2010)The Promise of Social Franchi…Tax incentives for inefficient executive pay and reward for luck (2007)Tax incentives for inefficien…Asymmetry in information versus asymmetry in power: Implicit assumptions of agency theory? (2007)Asymmetry in information vers…Struktur und Entwicklung der Controllingforschung — Eine Zitations-und Kozitationsanalyse von Controllingbeiträgen in deutschsprachigen wissenschaftlichen Zeitschriften von 1970 bis 2003 (2006)Struktur und Entwicklung der …Some Determinants of Corporate Risk Aversion (2006)Some Determinants of Corporat…Hedge accounting incentives for cash flow hedges of forecasted transactions (2006)Hedge accounting incentives f…Distributed decision making––a unified approach (2003)Distributed decision making––…On the Use of Nonfinancial Performance Measures in Management Compensation (2002)On the Use of Nonfinancial Pe…On the Use of Nonfinancial Performance Measures in Management Compensation (2002)On the Use of Nonfinancial Pe…Interaktionen im Dienstleistungsmanagement — Eine informationsökonomische Analyse (2001)Interaktionen im Dienstleistu…Grundlagen des Marktprozesses (2000)Grundlagen des MarktprozessesSkills, Incentives, and Control (1997)Skills, Incentives, and Contr…Standardisierung von Beratungsleistungen (1996)Standardisierung von Beratung…Hierarchical structures in organisations: A conceptual framework (1995)Hierarchical structures in or…The Theory of Syndicates (1968)Essays in the Theory of Risk-Bearing. (1972)Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. (1976)Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications (1981)Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring (1984)Agency Costs, Net Worth, And Business Fluctuations (1988)Decision Analysis: Introductory Lectures on Choices Under Uncertainty. (1969)Agency for International Development (1978)The interdisciplinary study of coordination (1994)Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective (1999)Increases in risk and in risk aversion (1974)Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have (1984)The Benefits of Lending Relationships: Evidence from Small Business Data (1994)Financial Dependence and Growth (1996)The Nature of the Firm (1937)Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control (1965)Separation of Ownership and Control (1983)A Survey of Corporate Governance (1997)Dynamic capabilities and strategic management (1997)CAPITAL ASSET PRICES: A THEORY OF MARKET EQUILIBRIUM UNDER CONDITIONS OF RISK* (1964)The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities (1973)Law and Finance (1998)General purpose technologies ‘Engines of growth’? (1995)A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action Presidential Address, American political Science Association, 1997 (2010)Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device (1986)Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm (1990)Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives (1991)What's the difference? diversity constructs as separation, variety, or disparity in organizations (2007)The Fundamental Institutions of China's Reforms and Development (2011)Top Incomes in the Long Run of History (2011)Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk (1988)Well-being : the foundations of hedonic psychology (1999)On the measurement of inequality (1970)THE VALUATION OF RISK ASSETS AND THE SELECTION OF RISKY INVESTMENTS IN STOCK PORTFOLIOS AND CAPITAL BUDGETS**This paper is another in a series of interrelated theoretical and statistical studies of corporate financial and investment policies being made under grants from the Rockefeller Foundation, and more recently the Ford Foundation, to the Harvard Business School. The generous support for this work is most gratefully acknowledged. The author is also much indebted to his colleagues Professors Bishop, Christenson, Kahr, Raiffa, and (especially) Schlaifer, for extensive discussion and commentary on an earlier draft of this paper; but responsibility for any errors or imperfections remains strictly his own.[Professor Sharpe's paper, “Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium Under Conditions of Risk” (Journal of Finance, September 1964) appeared after this paper was in final form and on its way to the printers. My first section, which parallels the first half of his paper (with corresponding conclusions), sets the algebraic framework for sections II, III and VI, (which have no counterpart in his paper) and for section IV on the equilibrium prices of risk assets, concerning which our results differ significantly for reasons which will be explored elsewhere. Sharpe does not take up the capital budgeting problem developed in section V below.] (1975)The arbitrage theory of capital asset pricing (1976)
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References

  • 1976Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure71,441 cited
  • 1981Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information12,762 cited
  • 1980Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm10,540 cited
  • 1996Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization9,565 cited
  • 1979Moral Hazard and Observability8,358 cited
  • 1982Moral Hazard in Teams4,992 cited
  • 1964Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large4,964 cited
  • 1976Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large4,655 cited
  • 1981Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts4,568 cited
  • 1973The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem.4,296 cited
  • 1979Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts3,033 cited
  • 2010Review of Economic Studies2,967 cited
  • 1983An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem2,127 cited
  • 1992An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem1,913 cited
  • 1979Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship1,285 cited
  • 1990Principals and Agents: The Structure of Business1,258 cited

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Cited by

  • 2003Distributed decision making––a unified approach150 cited
  • 2000Grundlagen des Marktprozesses139 cited
  • 2007Asymmetry in information versus asymmetry in power: Implicit assumptions of agency theory?102 cited
  • 1995Hierarchical structures in organisations: A conceptual framework82 cited
  • 2006Struktur und Entwicklung der Controllingforschung — Eine Zitations-und Kozitationsanalyse von Controllingbeiträgen in deutschsprachigen wissenschaftlichen Zeitschriften von 1970 bis 200351 cited
  • 2002On the Use of Nonfinancial Performance Measures in Management Compensation51 cited
  • 1997Skills, Incentives, and Control47 cited
  • 2017Taxation and agency conflicts between firm owners and managers: a review47 cited
  • 2023Governing Large Projects: A Three-Stage Process to Get It Right41 cited
  • 2007Tax incentives for inefficient executive pay and reward for luck39 cited
  • 2006Some Determinants of Corporate Risk Aversion35 cited
  • 1996Standardisierung von Beratungsleistungen34 cited
  • 2010The Promise of Social Franchising as a Model to Achieve Social Goals31 cited
  • 2002On the Use of Nonfinancial Performance Measures in Management Compensation29 cited
  • 2001Interaktionen im Dienstleistungsmanagement — Eine informationsökonomische Analyse29 cited
  • 2006Hedge accounting incentives for cash flow hedges of forecasted transactions27 cited