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Tax incentives for inefficient executive pay and reward for luck · Study

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ArticleTax incentives for inefficient executive pay and reward for luck

Robert F. Göx2007

OA

Articlegreen2007

Tax incentives for inefficient executive pay and reward for luck

39 citations·0/0 files stored·Review of Accounting Studies

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Corporate Finance and Governance Accounting and Organizational Management Corporate Taxation and Avoidance

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References

1979Moral Hazard and Observability 1987Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives 2003Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem 2001Are CEOs Rewarded for Luck? The Ones Without Principals Are 1989Sensitivity, Precision, and Linear Aggregation of Signals for Performance Evaluation 2003The Trouble with Stock Options 2004Remuneration: Where We've Been, How We Got to Here, What are the Problems, and How to Fix Them 2001Pay for performance? Government regulation and the structure of compensation contracts

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2018Executive Compensation, Corporate Governance, and Say on Pay 2013Indexing Executive Compensation Contracts 2008The Effects of Differential Taxation on Managerial Effort and Risk Taking

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2017Executive Compensation: A Survey of Theory and Evidencepreprint · 7 shared references 2017Executive Compensation: A Survey of Theory and Evidence ✶ ✶We thank Aubrey Clark, Fabrizio Ferri, Carola Frydman, Tom Gosling, Steve Kaplan, Gaizka Ormazabal, Kelly Shue, Alexander Wagner, David Zhang, and especially Pierre Chaigneau for helpful comments and Janet Chater, Irem Erten, Jesus Gorrin, Joseph Kalmenovitz, and Jiaying Wei for research assistance.chapter · 7 shared references 2006Why Has CEO Pay Increased so Much?preprint · 6 shared references 2007Chapter 12 Corporate Law and Governancechapter · 6 shared references 2007Limited Commitment in Multi‐agent Contracting*article · 6 shared references 2006Why Has CEO Pay Increased so Much?preprint · 6 shared references

Details

Year2007

Typearticle

Published2007-11-15

VenueReview of Accounting Studies

ISSN-L1380-6653

Languageen

Citations39

Files0 public / 0

ShelfCorporate Finance and Governance

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doi10.1007/s11142-007-9057-9

openalex_workW3124355426

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