Could gambling save science? Encouraging an honest consensus

Abstract

The pace of scientific progress may be hindered by the tendency of our academic institutions to reward being popular rather than being right. A market‐based alternative, where scientists can more formally ‘stake their reputation’, is presented here. It offers clear incentives to be careful and honest while contributing to a visible, self‐consistent consensus on controversial (or routine) scientific questions. In addition, it allows patrons to choose questions to be researched without choosing people or methods. The bulk of this paper is spent in examining potential problems with the proposed approach. After this examination, the idea still seems to be plausible and worthy of further study.

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