The Heterogeneity of Implicit Bias

Abstract

The term ‘implicit bias’ has been rapidly incorporated into philosophical discourse. This chapter scrutinizes the phenomena that fall under the rubric of implicit bias. The term is often used in a rather broad sense, to capture a range of implicit social cognitions (Saul, 2013; Gendler 2011). This chapter argues that this is useful for some purposes. However, we here articulate some of the important functional differences between phenomena identified as instances of implicit bias. We caution against ignoring these differences: it is likely they have considerable significance, not least for the sorts of normative recommendations being made concerning how to mitigate implicit bias. We reject the claim that one dimension of this heterogeneity is captured by the current ‘affective’ vs. ‘semantic’ distinction (e.g. Amodio and Devine, 2006). The way this distinction has been deployed cannot generate evidence for the claim that functional differences track this distinction.

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