On Embedded Implicatures

Abstract

The Gricean approach explains implicatures by assumptions about the \npragmatics of entire utterances. The phenomenon of embedded implicatures \nremains a challenge for this approach since in such cases apparently \nimplicatures contribute to the truth-conditional content of constituents smaller \nthan utterances. In this paper, I investigate three areas where embedded \nimplicatures seem to differ from implicatures at the utterance level: optionality, \nepistemic status, and implicated presuppositions. I conclude that the differences \nbetween the two kinds of implicatures justify an approach that maintains \nGricean assumptions at the utterance level, and assumes a special operator for \nembedded implicatures.

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