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Financial compensation of corporate officers in the context of efficiency of shareholder oversight and control has been an ongoing issue for a number of decades in the U.S. corporate environment. During the financial crisis of 2007-2008, excessive executive compensation became a focal point of criticism. The paper analyzes the effects of the recent financial crisis on the relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance, and examines whether or not the crisis reshaped this relationship between the two factors. Using the Standard and Poor’s ExecuComp database, we find that the relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance demonstrates different patterns in the pre- and post-crisis periods. These results suggest that incentive-based contracts were not effective compensation tools in the aftermath of the crisis.
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Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.
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