Unlocking the Doors of the Prisoner's Dilemma: Dependence, Selectivity, and Cooperation

Abstract

desired partner. This suggests that an exit option increases cooperation. We tested both hypotheses in laboratory experiments with human subjects, using Trump, a new cardgame representation of a Prisoner's Dilemma. In the first experiment, the exit option reduced dependence and increased selectivity, relative to a no-exit condition. We found that selectivity and dependence both increased cooperation, but for different reasons and with different players, leaving overall cooperation rates unchanged by an option to exit. In a second experiment, the exit option increased selectivity but not dependence, relative to a forced-exit condition. Here we observed higher cooperation with an option to exit, but only for subjects playing defensive strategies.

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