Against Omniscience: The Case from Essential Indexicals

Patrick Grim

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Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics Philosophy and Theoretical Science Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge

Abstract

Or so the argument goes.' Since an omniscient being would be a being that knows all that is known, since only I know what I know in knowing (1), and since I am not omniscient, there is no omniscient being. In what follows I want to present and ponder this and similar arguments against omniscience, each of which turns on the issue of knowledge expressed by means of indexicals: 'I,' 'here,' 'now,' and the like. Consider also the following argument, for example: No one knows at any time other than now-no one has known at any time in the past and no one will know at any time in the future-what I know in knowing that:

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References

1979Attitudes De Dicto and De Se 1999The Problems of Philosophy 1977Frege on Demonstratives 1941An Inquiry Into Meaning and Truth.1959Thank Goodness that's Over 1993The Coherence of Theism 1968On the Logic of Attributions of Self-Knowledge to Others 1976Aquinas: A collection of critical essays

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1987Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference, and the Self-Ascription View of Believing 1991Agency and Omniscience 2007Omniscience in Narrative Construction: Old Challenges and New

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