The Humean Tradition

Abstract

David Hume's discussions of causation have placed constraints on most subsequent accounts of scientific laws. After motivating and describing these Humean constraints, I will argue that they are unsatisfiable. There are two reasons for this conclusion. The first is that extant attempts to give such an account of laws face serious objections. This will be argued by reviewing familiar problems with a Naive Regularity Account and by considering two accounts representative of attempts to avoid these problems. The two accounts are David Lewis's account and an account discernible in Brian Skyrms's Causal Necessity. The second reason for my antiHumean conclusion is of a more general nature. I shall present an argument challenging a presupposition of any philosopher working within the Humean tradition.

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