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Communication and Post-Decision Information
7 references·16 citing·52 second hop
Communication and Post-Decision Information (1983)Communication and Post-Decision Informati…Pre-Decision Information and Participative Management Control Systems (1983)Pre-Decision Information and …Resource Allocation Under Asymmetric Information (1981)Resource Allocation Under Asy…Communication in Agencies (1981)Communication in AgenciesMoral Hazard and Observability (1979)Moral Hazard and ObservabilityIncentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem (1979)Incentive Compatibility and t…Disclosure Rules, Information-Production, and Capital Market Equilibrium: The Case of Forecast Disclosure Rules (1976)Disclosure Rules, Information…Insider Trading and the Stock Market (1967)Insider Trading and the Stock…Financial Reporting Discretion, Managerial Myopia, and Investment Efficiency (2021)Financial Reporting Discretio…Financial Reporting Conservatism and Voluntary CSR Disclosure (2020)Financial Reporting Conservat…Accounting Conservatism and Incentives: Intertemporal Considerations (2018)Accounting Conservatism and I…Management Earnings Forecasts as a Performance Target in Executive Compensation Contracts (2017)Management Earnings Forecasts…Understanding Practice and Institutions: A Historical Perspective (2016)Understanding Practice and In…Game Theory and Business Applications (2013)Game Theory and Business Appl…Accounting Discretion and Managerial Conservatism: An Intertemporal Analysis* (2006)Accounting Discretion and Man…The Role of Biased Earnings Guidance in Creating a Healthy Tension between Managers and Analysts (2005)The Role of Biased Earnings G…The Disciplining Role of Accounting in the Long-Run (2004)The Disciplining Role of Acco…National culture and subordinates' upward communication of private information (1998)National culture and subordin…Communication and delegation in collusive agencies (1995)Communication and delegation …Motivating Truthful Subordinate Reporting: An Experimental Investigation in a Two‐Subordinate Context* (1994)Motivating Truthful Subordina…Communication and Income Smoothing Through Accounting Method Choice (1990)Communication and Income Smoo…The Information Economics Approach to Financial Reporting (1988)The Information Economics App…On the allocation of fixed and variable costs from service departments* (1987)On the allocation of fixed an…Inside Trading and Incentives (1984)Inside Trading and IncentivesThe Theory of Syndicates (1968)Essays in the Theory of Risk-Bearing. 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The Basic Model (2004)Chapter 27 Recent Developments in the Theory of Regulation (2007)Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control (1965)Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications (1981)Investment and Insider Trading (1995)Voluntary Disclosures and the Trading Behavior of Corporate Insiders (1995)The Dollar Profits to Insider Trading (2021)Incentives in Teams (1973)Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods (1977)Compensation and Incentives: Practice vs. Theory (1988)The incidence of budgetary slack: a field study exploration (1997)Potential Functional and Dysfunctional Effects of Continuous Monitoring (Retracted) (2008)Factors Affecting Goal Difficulty and Performance When Employees Select Their Own Performance Goals: Evidence from the Field (2010)Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information (1979)Accounting for Stewardship (1981)A survey of agency models of organizations (1988)The Effect of Honesty and Superior Authority on Budget Proposals (2008)A Theory of the Allocation of Time (1965)The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism (1970)Risk, Return, and Equilibrium: Empirical Tests (1973)COMPETITIVE INFORMATION IN THE STOCK MARKET: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF EARNINGS, DIVIDENDS AND ANALYSTS' FORECASTS* (1976)The information content of SEC accounting series release no. 190 (1980)Reengineering Nonprofit Financial Accountability: Toward a More Reliable Foundation for Regulation (2003)Insider Trading: Should It Be Prohibited? (1992)Using Privileged Information to Manipulate Markets: Insiders, Gurus, and Credibility (1992)Do insider trades reflect both contrarian beliefs and superior knowledge about future cash flow realizations? (2004)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1979Moral Hazard and Observability8,358 cited
  • 1979Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem1,983 cited
  • 1981Resource Allocation Under Asymmetric Information434 cited
  • 1967Insider Trading and the Stock Market403 cited
  • 1983Pre-Decision Information and Participative Management Control Systems231 cited
  • 1981Communication in Agencies154 cited
  • 1976Disclosure Rules, Information-Production, and Capital Market Equilibrium: The Case of Forecast Disclosure Rules91 cited

Cited by

  • 2013Game Theory and Business Applications98 cited
  • 1984Inside Trading and Incentives74 cited
  • 1994Motivating Truthful Subordinate Reporting: An Experimental Investigation in a Two‐Subordinate Context*63 cited
  • 2020Financial Reporting Conservatism and Voluntary CSR Disclosure54 cited
  • 1995Communication and delegation in collusive agencies49 cited
  • 1990Communication and Income Smoothing Through Accounting Method Choice46 cited
  • 2021Financial Reporting Discretion, Managerial Myopia, and Investment Efficiency39 cited
  • 2005The Role of Biased Earnings Guidance in Creating a Healthy Tension between Managers and Analysts

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39 cited
  • 2006Accounting Discretion and Managerial Conservatism: An Intertemporal Analysis*37 cited
  • 2016Understanding Practice and Institutions: A Historical Perspective34 cited
  • 1988The Information Economics Approach to Financial Reporting29 cited
  • 1998National culture and subordinates' upward communication of private information27 cited
  • 2018Accounting Conservatism and Incentives: Intertemporal Considerations27 cited
  • 1987On the allocation of fixed and variable costs from service departments*26 cited
  • 2004The Disciplining Role of Accounting in the Long-Run23 cited
  • 2017Management Earnings Forecasts as a Performance Target in Executive Compensation Contracts23 cited