The Social Ascription of Motives

Abstract

Certain conceptions of motives are examined with regard to their sociological status: (1) motives as causal antecedent variables, (2) motives as characteristically private states of persons, and (3) motives as concrete speech acts, such as the giving of reasons, justifications, intentions, or accounts. These are found wanting because they do not permit a sociological understanding of motive as a public and observable course of social action. The relevance of motive to classical sociology resides instead in its status as a grammar of everyday language and conduct. We propose that any sociological account of motives requires attention to four public social conditions for the ascription of motive: (1) motives are observer's rules, (2) motivated objects are social members, (3) motives are a grammar of application, and (4) motives formulate social types of persons. These are confirmed sociological processes because they describe how motive is socially organized.

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