The European Parliament as a Conditional Agenda Setter: What Are the Conditions? A Critique of Tsebelis (1994)

Abstract

Tsebelis (1994) argues in the American Political Science Review that the European Parliament has important power due to its right as a conditional agenda setter. I claim that Tsebelis' argument is based either on an incomplete analysis or on inaccurately specified decision rules. An accurate modeling of the cooperation procedure as stated in Article 189c of the Treaty of the European Community and as applied in practice changes the results considerably. Based on such a model, I provide an explanation of why the European Parliament sometimes can make successful amendments.

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