Frege, The Tractatus, and the Logocentric Predicament

Abstract

The principles of logic are, let us remember, the principles of valid reasoning that set the standards of consistency. Inquiry into any subject matter whatsoever draws implicitly on these principles and must conform to these standards on pain of incoherence. Logic then has a privileged position among the sciences, and this position raises two questions. First, what is the subject matter of logic; what content for logical principles does justice to their role in setting standards of consistency? Second, from what vantage point are we able to isolate and elucidate the basic notions that enter into the formulation of logic? These questions become all the more pressing, once the study of logic is separated sharply from empirical psychological investigations of human cognition. The magnitude of Frege's innovation in logic makes him acutely aware of the logocentric predicament. Frege puts forward his begriffsschrift as a formulation of the principles of valid reasoning. In developing a conception of logic that supports this identification, Frege addresses the issues raised by the logocentric predicament. Indeed, an examination of Frege's conception of logic can serve to clarify those issues. However, in the end, this conception of logic is unsatisfactory. For there are deep tensions between Frege's official construal of the content of the axioms of the begriffsschrift, and his view of judgment that underlies the identification of the begriffsschrift as logic. Wittgenstein's Tractatus is, in large measure, a response to these tensions in Frege's thought. Wittgenstein largely

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