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Abstract

Research Summary We conducted a meta‐analysis of corporate crime deterrence strategies by using 80 effect sizes calculated from 58 studies in four treatment areas—Law, Punitive Sanctions, Regulatory Policy, and Multiple Treatments. Of the single‐treatment strategies, only Regulatory Policy produced a significant deterrent impact at the company level, but the results were not consistent across all study and effect size types. Studies examining multiple treatments, though, produced a consistent, significant deterrent effect on offending at both the individual and company levels. Policy Implications Our results suggest that regulatory policies that involve consistent inspections and include a cooperative or educational component aimed at the industry may have a substantial impact on corporate offending. However, a mixture of agency interventions will likely have the biggest impact on broadly defined corporate crime. The variety of offenders and behaviors included in corporate crime and its relative complexity likely necessitate multiple intervention strategies, which is similar to the “pulling levers” approach developed to deter gang violence and the responsive regulation strategy advocated by Braithwaite (2011). However, given some of the shortcomings in the literature, we also recommend that scholars and practitioners more clearly and consistently define the phenomenon of “corporate crime” and target evaluation research toward specific programs and interventions.

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