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Bridging Rationality and Accuracy
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Bridging Rationality and Accuracy (2015)Bridging Rationality and AccuracyEpistemic Risk and the Demands of Rationality (2022)Epistemic Risk and the Demand…Suspension, Higher-Order Evidence, and Defeat (2021)Suspension, Higher-Order Evid…Updating for externalists (2019)Updating for externalistsReturn to Reason (2019)Return to ReasonPredictably Misleading Evidence (2019)Predictably Misleading Eviden…Evidence: A Guide for the Uncertain (2019)Evidence: A Guide for the Unc…WHAT IS JUSTIFIED CREDENCE? (2018)WHAT IS JUSTIFIED CREDENCE?Permissivism and the Value of Rationality: A Challenge to the Uniqueness Thesis (2018)Permissivism and the Value of…Permissive Metaepistemology (2018)Permissive MetaepistemologyLying, risk and accuracy (2017)Lying, risk and accuracyConditionalization Does Not (in General) Maximize Expected Accuracy (2017)Conditionalization Does Not (…Higher‐Order Defeat is Object‐Independent (2016)Higher‐Order Defeat is Object…DISAGREEMENT, DRUGS, ETC.: FROM ACCURACY TO AKRASIA (2016)DISAGREEMENT, DRUGS, ETC.: FR…An Accuracy Based Approach to Higher Order Evidence (2016)An Accuracy Based Approach to…What is Justified Belief? (1979)Contemporary Theories of Knowledge. (1988)Ethics Without Principles (2004)Transitional attitudes and the unmooring view of higher‐order evidence (2021)The Problem of the Essential Indexical (1979)Oxford Studies In Epistemology (2007)Peer Disagreement and Higher‐Order Evidence (2010)Rational Polarization (2021)Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News (2007)Reflection and Disagreement (2007)Thinking, Fast and Slow (2011)Formulating Independence (2019)Disagreement and alienation (2023)Laws and symmetry (1989)Knowledge and its Limits (2002)The Externalist’s Guide to Fishing for Compliments (2017)The Metaphysics of Representation (2020)Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life (1979)The Intentional Stance (1987)A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism (1998)Lying, accuracy and credence (2017)Lying and Certainty (2018)Lying, speech acts, and commitment (2020)I.—STUDIES IN THE LOGIC OF CONFIRMATION (I.) (1945)Laws and Symmetry (1989)Ecumenical Expressivism: Finessing Frege (2006)Grit (2018)A Defense of Intrapersonal Belief Permissivism (2019)Thinking, Guessing, and Believing (2022)Elicitation of Personal Probabilities and Expectations (1971)Reasons for Reliabilism (2021)Knowledge and Its Limits (2000)How Do Beliefs Simplify Reasoning? (2019)Unsettled Thoughts (2019)What's Wrong with Moore's Argument? (2004)Intellectual courage and inquisitive reasons (2023)Exposition of a New Theory on the Measurement of Risk (1954)A theory of anticipated utility (1982)The Grounds of Political Legitimacy (2023)Theorizing Risk Economics (2024)
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  • 2016An Accuracy Based Approach to Higher Order Evidence110 cited
  • 2018Permissivism and the Value of Rationality: A Challenge to the Uniqueness Thesis108 cited
  • 2016DISAGREEMENT, DRUGS, ETC.: FROM ACCURACY TO AKRASIA94 cited
  • 2019Evidence: A Guide for the Uncertain89 cited
  • 2017Conditionalization Does Not (in General) Maximize Expected Accuracy87 cited
  • 2017Lying, risk and accuracy70 cited
  • 2022Epistemic Risk and the Demands of Rationality52 cited
  • 2016Higher‐Order Defeat is Object‐Independent46 cited
  • 2018WHAT IS JUSTIFIED CREDENCE?42 cited
  • 2019Predictably Misleading Evidence40 cited
  • 2019Updating for externalists35 cited
  • 2021Suspension, Higher-Order Evidence, and Defeat33 cited
  • 2018Permissive Metaepistemology31 cited
  • 2019Return to Reason26 cited

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