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Alignment vs rent-extraction effects of stock options. A conceptual model
16 references·0 citing·29 second hop
Alignment vs rent-extraction effects of stock options. A conceptual model (2016)Alignment vs rent-extraction effects of s…Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem (2003)Executive Compensation as an …Agency Problems in Large Family Business Groups (2003)Agency Problems in Large Fami…Stock options for undiversified executives (2002)Stock options for undiversifi…Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation (2002)Managerial Power and Rent Ext…Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings (2002)Disentangling the Incentive a…The use of equity grants to manage optimal equity incentive levels (1999)The use of equity grants to m…Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance (1999)Corporate governance, chief e…A Survey of Corporate Governance (1997)A Survey of Corporate Governa…The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems (1993)The Modern Industrial Revolut…Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives (1990)Performance Pay and Top-Manag…Management ownership and market valuation (1988)Management ownership and mark…The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (1987)The Economic Institutions of …Agency Problems and Residual Claims (1983)Agency Problems and Residual …Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure (1976)Theory of the firm: Manageria…The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem. (1973)The Economic Theory of Agency…The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1933)The Modern Corporation and Pr…Decision Analysis: Introductory Lectures on Choices Under Uncertainty. (1969)Essays in the Theory of Risk-Bearing. (1972)Internal Labor Markets and Manpower Analysis (1972)Moral Hazard and Observability (1979)Moral Hazard in Teams (1982)Signaling Theory: A Review and Assessment (2010)Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm (1980)Separation of Ownership and Control (1983)Law and Finance (1998)Corporate Ownership Around the World (1999)Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors (1996)Boards of Directors as an Endogenously Determined Institution: A Survey of the Economic Literature (2001)Corporate Governance and Equity Prices (2003)On the use of instrumental variables in accounting research (2009)The Nature of the Firm (1937)EFFICIENT CAPITAL MARKETS: A REVIEW OF THEORY AND EMPIRICAL WORK* (1970)The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities (1973)Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have (1984)An Integrative Model Of Organizational Trust (1995)Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers (1986)Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers (1996)Theory of Value (1959)Auditor size and audit quality (1981)Strategic assets and organizational rent (1993)The Commitment-Trust Theory of Relationship Marketing (1994)Dynamic capabilities and strategic management (1997)Social Capital, Intellectual Capital, and the Organizational Advantage (1998)Legal Determinants of External Finance (1997)Investor protection and corporate governance (2000)
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References

  • 1976Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure71,441 cited
  • 1997A Survey of Corporate Governance16,237 cited
  • 1987The Economic Institutions of Capitalism14,872 cited
  • 1993The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems8,544 cited
  • 1933The Modern Corporation and Private Property7,361 cited
  • 1988Management ownership and market valuation6,910 cited
  • 1990Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives5,080 cited
  • 1983Agency Problems and Residual Claims4,877 cited
  • 1999Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance4,334 cited
  • 1973The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem.4,296 cited
  • 2002Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings3,845 cited
  • 2003Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem2,347 cited
  • 1999The use of equity grants to manage optimal equity incentive levels1,457 cited
  • 2002Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation1,405 cited
  • 2002Stock options for undiversified executives1,167 cited

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2003
Agency Problems in Large Family Business Groups
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