Institutional Analysis of Credit Co‐Operatives

Avishay Braverman · José Luis Guasch

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Cooperative Studies and Economics Microfinance and Financial Inclusion Banking Systems and Strategies

Abstract

Abstract In this chapter, the authors present an analysis of the motivation, formation, and design of credit cooperatives and show how their degree of success is likely to depend crucially on the particular incentive schemes, extent of control over resources, quality monitoring, and enforcement of punishment rules.

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References

1960The Problem of Social Cost 1957Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function 1966The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups.1970Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States.1954Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour 1986The Economic Institutions of Capitalism 1996Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization 1979Moral Hazard and Observability

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