Constitutional Adjudication, Italian Style

Abstract

We have written elsewhere of the rise of constitutional adjudication in the postwar period, especially in Europe. We emphasized in our previous work that the new institutions of constitutional adjudication were nearly always created following periods of authoritarian rule: initially in Germany and Italy following the World War II, then in Greece, Spain, and Portugal following the collapse of authoritarian regimes, and again in Eastern Europe and post-Soviet Russia after the fall of the communist regimes in those countries. We distinguished among three ideal typical regimes, which we called the Italian, German, and French models. Of course, our discussion of the French case emphasized that it was special both because it was not an authoritarian regime prior to the establishment of the Fifth Republic and because the French Conseil Constitutionnel was not really established as a constitutional court, although it has effectively become one after the constitution was amended in 1974. Nevertheless, we included this special case because it was established in a new constitution and because as of this writing, it plainly has demonstrated its potential to develop into a genuine instrument for constitutional adjudication.

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