I argue that pessimistic inductions over the history of science have not made the case that the failures of our predecessors give us reason to dial down our confidence in our scientific theories.I explain why an effective pessimistic induction must do more than meets the eye; it must show that 1) the supposed unreliability of our predecessors is relevant to what we should think about our own reliability, and 2) if we believe that we are lacking reliability -a second-order property -then we are rationally obligated to withdraw confidence in our first-order beliefs.I assist the pessimist by providing an account of fallibility that explains why the second is true.However, I show that the fact that we use different methods than our predecessors breaks the pessimistic induction from their unreliability to a conclusion that we are unreliable.To threaten our rational confidence in our particular theories, the pessimist needs much more than he has offered. Why worry?How confident does the history of science allow us to be about our current well-tested scientific theories, and why?The scientific realist thinks we are well within our rights to believe our best-tested theories, or some aspects of them, are approximately true. 1 Ambitious arguments have been made to this effect, such as that over historical time our scientific theories are converging to the truth, that the retention of concepts and claims is evidence for this, and that there can be no other serious explanation of the practical success of science than that its theories are approximately true.There is appeal in each of these ideas, but making such strong claims has tended to be hazardous, leaving us open to charges that many typical episodes in the history of science just do not fit the model.(See, e.g., Laudan 1981.)Arguing for a realist attitude via general claims --properties ascribed to sets of theories, trends we see in progressions of theories, and claimed links between general properties like success and truth that apply or fail to apply to any theory regardless of its content -is like arguing for or via a theory of science, which brings with it the obligation to defend that theory.I think a realist attitude can be maintained rationally and without such a theory, as I will try to explain.The starting point at which questions arise as to what in general we have a right to believe about our theories is one where we have theories and evidence for them, and we are involved in the natural or unreflective activity of apportioning our belief in each in
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