The Independent Moral Significance of Wrongdoing

Abstract

Abstract A fundamental division within the theory of responsibility is between those who think that causation of a harm attempted or culpably risks increases blameworthiness, and those who think it does not. This is the issue commonly called ‘moral luck.’ The chapter first seeks to recast the problem, finding it to be ill-cast as a problem of luck. It then defends the view that causation of a harm matters to overall blameworthiness. It does so after rejecting all extent arguments for this conclusion in the existing literature, arguing not just that they are bad but that they are hopeless. The defense offered in the chapter is first put in foundationalist justificatory mode and then in non-foundationalist justificatory mode.

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