——, yìshì, duh, um, and consciousness

Abstract

This chapter deals with the adequacy of the term ‘consciousness’ as referring to something to be explained. It adopts two strategies for this. First, the chapter suggests that if there is an explanandum, one ought to find that it is picked out by language. Second, given that in English the term exists, the chapter asks whether it refers to something which for scientific purposes is unitary or coherent. On the first issue, it concludes that there is little equivalence to the terms ‘mind’ and ‘consciousness’ in the lexicons of classical Greek, Chinese, Croatian, or even in the English of a few centuries ago. On the second issue, after listing the referents of ‘consciousness’ in psychology, the chapter suggests that the relationship between them is that of an arbitrary set rather than that of a ‘natural kind’.

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