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The Role of Evidential Weight in Criminal Proof
4 references·16 citing·40 second hop
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References

  • 1973A Treatise on Probability2,575 cited
  • 1965Aspects of Scientific Explanation and other Essays in the Philosophy of Science1,846 cited
  • 1977The Probable and The Provable873 cited
  • 1968Corroboration, Explanation, Evolving Probability, Simplicity and a Sharpened Razor179 cited

Cited by

  • 2016The Burdens of Proof58 cited
  • 1996Base rates do not constrain nonprobability judgments32 cited
  • 1989Extending explanatory coherence27 cited
  • 1996The Refoundation of Evidence Law26 cited
  • 1996Fallacy and controversy about base rates19 cited
  • 1996The purpose of experiments: Ecological validity versus comparing hypotheses16 cited
  • 1996Factors Affecting the Use of Naked Statistical Evidence of Liability16 cited
  • 2021Weight of Evidence15 cited
  • 1996The implicit use of base rates in experiential and ecologically valid tasks13 cited
  • 1996Why do frequency formats improve Bayesian reasoning? Cognitive algorithms work on information, which needs representation10 cited
  • 1996The base rate controversy: Is the glass half-full or half-empty?8 cited

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1996
Base rates, experience, and the big picture
6 cited
  • 1996How to reconsider the base rate fallacy without forgetting the concept of systematic processing5 cited
  • 1996Judgment under uncertainty: Evolution may not favor a probabilistic calculus5 cited
  • 1996Cognitive algebra versus representativeness heuristic4 cited
  • 1996First things first: What is a base rate?4 cited