What is the Problem of De Se Attitudes?

Abstract

Do de se thoughts pose a distinctive problem for traditional theories of propositional attitudes? Ever since the seminal work of Perry and Lewis, the standard answer to this question has been in the affirmative. But in recent years, a number of philosophers have argued that there is no distinctive problem of de se attitudes: any problem posed by de se attitudes is simply an instance of some more general problem. While these skeptics are right that many of the arguments discussed in the literature do not reveal what the distinctive problem is, this chapter argues that there is nevertheless a distinctive problem of de se attitudes and tries to say what that problem is, why it is specific to the de se, and how various theories of the de se can all be seen as responding to this common problem.

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