The Right, the Good, and the Threat of Despair

Abstract

Abstract Kant rejects all of the standard accounts of the dependence of morality on religious claims or commitment. He nevertheless thinks that morality “leads to” religion. I defend an account of this “leading to” relationship, arguing that it is the result of Kant’s struggle to capture the practical import of the consequences of our actions within a moral theory that rejects the idea that we must maximize the good. I argue that all moral theories face some version of the tension that Kant is attempting to negotiate. On Kant’s view, the best way to acknowledge that the outcomes of our actions matter, while maintaining uncompromising commitment to the moral law, is to hope in God.

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