Kierkegaard's Ethic of Love

Abstract

Abstract Kierkegaard presents a form of divine command theory of moral obligation similar to accounts developed by Robert Adams and Philip Quinn. The account understands the relation humans have with a loving God as making possible the greatest human good, and as creating those unique obligations we designate as moral. God’s commands should be obeyed, not because of fear of divine punishment, but out of love and gratitude for the good that God has bestowed on humanity. Though God can and does address specific individuals, the fundamental divine command is the injunction – common to Judaism and Christianity – to love one’s neighbour as oneself. God’s commands are not arbitrary; they are directed at human flourishing and lead to genuine happiness, even though obedience to them requires self-denial and is not egoistically motivated. This Kierkegaardian ethic, found principally in Works of Love, has advantages over its contemporary secular rivals, such as evolutionary naturalism, social contract theories, and moral relativism. Additionally, this form of divine command theory resists the fundamental objections often posed against a religiously grounded ethic.

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