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Vom Nutzen (un-)informierter Agenten: Eine informationsökonomische Betrachtung des Controllings
16 references·1 citing·43 second hop
Vom Nutzen (un-)informierter Agenten: Eine informationsökonomische Betrachtung des Controllings (2001)Vom Nutzen (un-)informierter Agenten: Ein…Interne Unternehmensrechnung (2000)Interne UnternehmensrechnungProduct Costing in the Presence of Endogenous Subcost Functions (1997)Product Costing in the Presen…Budgeting and Hierarchical Control (1997)Budgeting and Hierarchical Co…Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure (1995)Firms, Contracts, and Financi…Controlling : Konzeption, Aufgaben und Instrumente (1995)Controlling : Konzeption, Auf…Cost Driver Optimization in Activity-Based Costing. (1993)Cost Driver Optimization in A…Participation, Slack, and Budget-Based Performance Evaluation (1991)Participation, Slack, and Bud…Erlösplanung im industriellen Anlagengeschäft (1986)Erlösplanung im industriellen…Information-eliciting compensation schemes (1985)Information-eliciting compens…Capital Rationing and Organizational Slack in Capital Budgeting (1985)Capital Rationing and Organiz…A complete solution to a class of principal-agent problems with an application to the control of a self-managed firm (1984)A complete solution to a clas…Pre-Decision Information and Participative Management Control Systems (1983)Pre-Decision Information and …Limited liability contracts between principal and agent (1983)Limited liability contracts b…Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs (1982)Regulating a Monopolist with …Moral Hazard and Observability (1979)Moral Hazard and ObservabilityThe Nature of the Firm (1937)The Nature of the FirmDie Bedeutung verhaltensorientierter Aspekte in der Controllingausbildung an deutschen Universitäten (2008)Die Bedeutung verhaltensorien…Essays in the Theory of Risk-Bearing. (1972)The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem. (1973)Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. (1976)Moral Hazard in Teams (1982)Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring (1984)Agency Costs, Net Worth, And Business Fluctuations (1988)Measuring manufacturing performance: a new challenge for managerial accounting research (1983)A Critical Overview of the Use of Full-Cost Data for Planning and Pricing (2002)The fragmented communication structure within the accounting academia: the case of activity-based costing research genres (2002)On the Determinants of Measurement Error in Time-Driven Costing (2008)The Problem of Social Cost (1960)Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure (1976)Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have (1984)A Survey of Corporate Governance (1997)Law and Finance (1998)Investor protection and corporate governance (2000)An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation (1971)Monopoly and product quality (1978)Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms (1986)Ironing, Sweeping, and Multidimensional Screening (1998)The Economics of Career Concerns, Part I: Comparing Information Structures (1999)Richard M. Cyert & James G. March, A Behavioral Theory of The Firm, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1963, 332 s. (1964)Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem (1979)Optimal Auction Design (1981)Executive Effort and Selection of Risky Projects (1986)Honesty in Managerial Reporting (2001)Divisional Managers and Internal Capital Markets (2012)Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result (1973)Prices vs. Quantities (1974)Monopoly with Incomplete Information (1984)The Politics of Government Decision-Making: A Theory of Regulatory Capture (1991)Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information (1979)Accounting for Stewardship (1981)A survey of agency models of organizations (1988)Communication in Settings with No Transfers (1991)Controlling als Koordinationsfunktion? (2000)Sicherstellung der Effektivität und Effizienz der Führung als Kernfunktion des Controlling (2001)“Controlling” as an academic discipline: the development of management accounting and management control research in German-speaking countries between 1970 and 2003 (2008)Agency Costs, Collateral, and Business Fluctuations (1986)Product-Market Competition and Managerial Slack (1988)A Theory of Trickle-Down Growth and Development (1997)Toward a knowledge‐based theory of the firm (1996)Dynamic capabilities and strategic management (1997)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1937The Nature of the Firm23,826 cited
  • 1979Moral Hazard and Observability8,358 cited
  • 1995Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure4,671 cited
  • 1982Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs1,724 cited
  • 1984A complete solution to a class of principal-agent problems with an application to the control of a self-managed firm648 cited
  • 1983Limited liability contracts between principal and agent520 cited
  • 1985Capital Rationing and Organizational Slack in Capital Budgeting450 cited
  • 1995Controlling : Konzeption, Aufgaben und Instrumente243 cited
  • 1983Pre-Decision Information and Participative Management Control Systems231 cited
  • 1993Cost Driver Optimization in Activity-Based Costing.148 cited
  • 1991Participation, Slack, and Budget-Based Performance Evaluation83 cited
  • 2000Interne Unternehmensrechnung78 cited
  • 1985Information-eliciting compensation schemes65 cited
  • 1997Product Costing in the Presence of Endogenous Subcost Functions51 cited
  • 1997Budgeting and Hierarchical Control43 cited
  • 1986Erlösplanung im industriellen Anlagengeschäft

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31 cited

Cited by

  • 2008Die Bedeutung verhaltensorientierter Aspekte in der Controllingausbildung an deutschen Universitäten9 cited