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The Choice of Peers for Relative Performance Evaluation in Executive Compensation
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The Choice of Peers for Relative Performance Evaluation in Executive Compensation (2016)The Choice of Peers for Relative Performa…Are all CEOs above average? An empirical analysis of compensation peer groups and pay design (2011)Are all CEOs above average? A…Inside the black box: The role and composition of compensation peer groups☆ (2010)Inside the black box: The rol…Performance evaluation and self-designated benchmark indexes in the mutual fund industry (2009)Performance evaluation and se…Peer firms in relative performance evaluation (2009)Peer firms in relative perfor…Executive compensation (2008)Executive compensationCEO Turnover and Relative Performance Evaluation (2006)CEO Turnover and Relative Per…Asymmetric benchmarking in compensation: Executives are rewarded for good luck but not penalized for bad (2006)Asymmetric benchmarking in co…An Empirical Analysis of Analysts' Target Prices: Short‐term Informativeness and Long‐term Dynamics (2003)An Empirical Analysis of Anal…Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation (2002)Managerial Power and Rent Ext…Relative Performance Evaluation for Chief Executive Officers (1989)Relative Performance Evaluati…Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives (1987)Aggregation and Linearity in …An Empirical Investigation of the Relative Performance Evaluation of Corporate Executives (1986)An Empirical Investigation of…Moral Hazard in Teams (1982)Moral Hazard in TeamsRank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts (1981)Rank-Order Tournaments as Opt…On Moral Hazard and Insurance (1979)On Moral Hazard and InsuranceMoral Hazard and Observability (1979)Moral Hazard and ObservabilityThe Theory of Syndicates (1968)Essays in the Theory of Risk-Bearing. (1972)Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. (1976)Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring (1984)Agency Costs, Net Worth, And Business Fluctuations (1988)The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities (1973)Corporate performance and managerial remuneration (1985)Performance Measure Congruity and Diversity in Multi-Task Principal/Agent Relations. (1994)The Provision of Incentives in Firms (1999)Contracting theory and accounting (2001)Returns to Buying Winners and Selling Losers: Implications for Stock Market Efficiency (1993)Corporate Governance and Equity Prices (2003)CEOs' Outside Employment Opportunities and the Lack of Relative Performance Evaluation in Compensation Contracts (2006)Are Incentive Contracts Rigged by Powerful CEOs? (2011)Optimal Taxation of Top Labor Incomes: A Tale of Three Elasticities (2011)Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications (1981)Agency costs and innovation (1989)Risk Taking by Mutual Funds as a Response to Incentives (1997)The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model (2001)Outside directors and CEO turnover (1988)Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives (1990)High Wage Workers and High Wage Firms (1999)The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems (1999)Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification (1979)Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship (1979)The judgment proof problem (1986)Moral Hazard and Nonmarket Institutions: Dysfunctional Crowding Out or Peer Monitoring? (1991)Market Insurance, Self-Insurance, and Self-Protection (1992)Testing for Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets (2009)Co-Integration and Error Correction: Representation, Estimation, and Testing (1987)Common risk factors in the returns on stocks and bonds (1993)On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance (1997)Buys, holds, and sells: The distribution of investment banks’ stock ratings and the implications for the profitability of analysts’ recommendations (2005)Analysts’ Forecasts: What Do We Know after Decades of Work? (2011)Analyst Recommendations, Mutual Fund Herding, and Overreaction in Stock Prices (2013)General purpose technologies ‘Engines of growth’? (1995)A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action Presidential Address, American political Science Association, 1997 (2010)What's the difference? diversity constructs as separation, variety, or disparity in organizations (2007)The Fundamental Institutions of China's Reforms and Development (2011)Top Incomes in the Long Run of History (2011)The External Control of Organizations. (1978)Income Inequality in the United States, 1913-1998 (2003)Political turnover and economic performance: the incentive role of personnel control in China (2004)
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References

  • 1979Moral Hazard and Observability8,358 cited
  • 1982Moral Hazard in Teams4,992 cited
  • 1981Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts4,568 cited
  • 1987Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives2,870 cited
  • 2008Executive compensation2,390 cited
  • 1989Relative Performance Evaluation for Chief Executive Officers954 cited
  • 1979On Moral Hazard and Insurance712 cited
  • 1986An Empirical Investigation of the Relative Performance Evaluation of Corporate Executives677 cited
  • 2003An Empirical Analysis of Analysts' Target Prices: Short‐term Informativeness and Long‐term Dynamics504 cited
  • 2006Asymmetric benchmarking in compensation: Executives are rewarded for good luck but not penalized for bad480 cited
  • 2010Inside the black box: The role and composition of compensation peer groups☆455 cited
  • 2009Peer firms in relative performance evaluation350 cited
  • 2009Performance evaluation and self-designated benchmark indexes in the mutual fund industry350 cited
  • 2006CEO Turnover and Relative Performance Evaluation341 cited
  • 2002Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation304 cited

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  • 2011Are all CEOs above average? An empirical analysis of compensation peer groups and pay design298 cited
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