The Metaphysical Basis of Śāntideva's Ethics

Abstract

Western Buddhists often believe and proclaim that \nmetaphysical speculation is irrelevant to Buddhist ethics \nor practice. This view is problematic even with respect to \nearly Buddhism, and cannot be sustained regarding later \nIndian Buddhists. In Śāntideva’s famous Bodhicaryāvatāra, \nmultiple claims about the nature of reality are premises \nfor conclusions about how human beings should act; that \nis, metaphysics logically entails ethics for Śāntideva, as it \ndoes for many Western philosophers. This article explores \nfour key arguments that Śāntideva makes from \nmetaphysics to ethics: actions are determined by their \ncauses, and therefore we should not get angry; the body is \nreducible to its component parts, and therefore we should \nneither protect it nor lust after other bodies; the self is an \nillusion, and therefore we should be altruistic; all \nphenomena are empty, and therefore we should not be \nattached to them. The exploration of these arguments \ntogether shows us why metaphysical claims can matter a \ngreat deal for Buddhist ethics, practice and liberation.

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